The Astro-Nomos: On International Legal Paradigms and the Legal Status of the West Bank by Ben-Naftali, Orna & Reznik, Rafi
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 
Volume 14 Issue 3 
2015 
The Astro-Nomos: On International Legal Paradigms and the 
Legal Status of the West Bank 
Orna Ben-Naftali 
Haim Striks School of Law, the College of Management Academic Studies 
Rafi Reznik 
Tel-Aviv University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies 
 Part of the International Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Orna Ben-Naftali and Rafi Reznik, The Astro-Nomos: On International Legal Paradigms and the Legal 
Status of the West Bank, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 399 (2015), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss3/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Global Studies Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
399 
THE ASTRO-NOMOS: ON INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL PARADIGMS AND THE LEGAL STATUS 
OF THE WEST BANK 
ORNA BEN-NAFTALI 
RAFI REZNIK

 
ABSTRACT 
The continuous Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territory may well 
have exhausted the international community and exasperated the 
Palestinians, but it still stimulates the Israeli legal imagination. In 2012, 
the Israeli government established an expert committee to examine the 
status of Jewish construction in the West Bank. The committee’s report 
concluded that from an international legal perspective, the West Bank is 
not occupied territory; the law of belligerent occupation is not applicable 
to the area; the “prevailing view” is that Jewish settlements are lawful; 
and that Israel has a valid claim to sovereignty over the territory. This 
Article, combining a doctrinal analysis with both Cover’s notion of 
‘Nomos and Narrative’ and Kuhn’s ‘Structure of Scientific Revolutions,’ 
posits that the report is epistemologically groundless and ethically 
blemished. The committee’s reading of international law substitutes an 
ideology for professionalism. The ideology, resurrecting the long 
discredited colonialist/Orientalist paradigm, reflects an idiosyncratic 
utopian vision, one that is simultaneously hegemonic and insular. 
Consequently, its legal position is methodologically extraneous to the 
structure of international law, substantively at odds with the compelling 
commitment of the international community to self-determination, and 
ethically dystopian.  
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I. INTRODUCTION: ON A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE TWO CHIEF WORLD 
SYSTEMS
1
 
“Think left and think right and  
think low and think high. 
Oh, the thinks you can think up 
If only you try” 
—Dr. Seuss, OH, THE THINKS YOU CAN THINK!2 
Imagine that a devout government is displeased with the worldwide 
acceptance by the scientific community of the Copernican paradigm. 
Deeply convinced of the inherent truth reflected in the idea that “The sun 
also ariseth, and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to his place where he 
arose”3 and ergo that “the world also shall be established that it shall not 
be moved”,4 yet aware that in the 21st century it is expected to ground this 
conviction in scientific evidence, it decides, against the protest of its chief 
scientist, to set up a committee of like-minded experts entrusted with the 
task of supplying it with this evidence. A committee headed by Mr. 
Ptolemy, a retired member of its National Scientific Council and 
comprising two other scientists who retired from prestigious positions in 
the public service is established. Imagine further that the dedicated work 
of the Ptolemy Committee generates a report concluding, albeit on the 
basis of anecdotal evidence, that there is no doubt that from a scientific 
perspective the entire universe circles around the earth and asserts that this 
indeed is the prevailing view of the relevant scientific community. This 
 
 
 1. GALILEO GALILEI, THE DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE TWO CHIEF WORLD SYSTEMS (Stillman 
Drake ed. & trans., Modern Library 2001) (1632). 
 2. DR. SEUSS, OH, THE THINKS YOU CAN THINK! (1975). 
 3. Ecclesiastes 1:5 (King James). 
 4. Psalms 96:10 (King James). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss3/6
  
 
 
 
 
2015] THE ASTRO-NOMOS 401 
 
 
 
 
unequivocal conclusion seems to have exceeded even the high 
expectations of the government. Weary of the reaction of heathen 
governments and the global community of less creative scientists, and 
much to the dismay of some of its sanctimonious ministers, it has opted, at 
least for the time being, for a deferral of the official adoption of the report. 
Looking at life through the wrong end of the telescope, much like 
being nostalgic for the future, may well have its rewards. At times, it may 
even transcend individual self-deception and become a political force 
driving a backward-looking revolution. Scientific revolutions, however, do 
not develop anachronistically.
5
 There is a happy distinction to be 
maintained between science and “the science of things that aren’t so.”6 
The latter, characterized primarily by a claim of great accuracy 
substantiated by little more than wishful thinking and sloppy method, is 
colloquially known as “junk science.”7 Junk science is an epistemic vice. 
When it is ideologically motivated, it is also an ethical vice.
8
 
The genesis and the report of the imaginary Ptolemy Committee 
provide a paradigmatic example of such vices. The genesis and the report 
of the real-life Committee to Examine the Status of Building in Judea and 
Samaria, known, after the name of its chairman, Edmond Levy, as the 
Levy Committee Report (LCR),
9
 obviate the need for imagined scenarios, 
but deserve the same assessment. 
On February 13, 2012, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and 
then Minister of Justice, Professor Yaakov Neeman, decided to establish a 
committee to examine the legal status of Israeli construction in the Judea 
and Samaria (a.k.a. “the West Bank”).10 The decision, taken despite the 
opposition of the Attorney General, was a response to both public and 
legal pressures: in the legal arena, numerous petitions requesting the 
 
 
 5. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996). 
 6. Irving Langmuir, Pathological Sciences, 42 PHYSICS TODAY 36 (1989). 
 7. See generally Peter W. Huber, On Law and Sciosophy, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 319 (1990). 
 8. Jeffrey D. Kovac, Science, Law and the Ethics of Expertise, 67 TENN. L. REV. 397, 407 
(1999–2000) (citing John Hardwig, Towards an Ethics of Expertise, in PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 83, 95 (Daniel E. Wueste ed., 1994)). 
 9. REPORT ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF BUILDING IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA (2012) [hereinafter the 
LCR], available at http://www.pmo.gov.il/Documents/doch090712.pdf [Hebrew]. An English translation 
of the conclusions and recommendations is available at http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/ 
D9D07DCF58E781C585257A3A005956A6, and at http://elderofziyon.blogspot.cz/2012/07/english-
translation-of-legal-arguments.html#.VjYsRvkrLIV 
 10. Power resorts to manipulation of language to direct thinking and affect its range. The 
territory known as “the West Bank” in international legal language, is referred to, in official Israeli 
language, as “Judea and Samaria,” connoting the link between the State of Israel and the Promised 
Land. See letter from the committee members to Netanyahu and Neeman attached to the LCR, supra 
note 9. 
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Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) to order the State to demolish, or 
implement demolition orders against illegal construction by Israeli settlers 
in outposts in the West Bank or otherwise order the evacuation of 
unauthorized such outposts, were pending. In the public arena, right wing 
elements wanted to establish a legal foundation for existing and planned 
Jewish constructions in the West Bank and, in the process, refute a 2005 
report commissioned, and subsequently approved, by then Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon and then Attorney-General Menachem Mazuz, which 
concluded that the construction of unauthorized Jewish outposts in the 
West Bank was illegal (the Sasson Report).
11
 
The composition of the committee is noteworthy: Justice Levy was the 
only judge in a panel of eleven judges who accepted a petition submitted 
by the Gaza Coast Regional Planning against the Government’s decision 
to disengage from the Gaza Strip and evacuate the settlers from the area. 
In this context, he determined as follows: 
Prior to the entry of the State of Israel, there was no sovereign in the 
area of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip recognized in accordance 
with international law. Conversely, the State of Israel, which now 
holds these territories, does so not by virtue of being an ‘occupying 
power’, but by virtue of the fact that on the one hand it replaced the 
Mandate government, and on the other hand, it is the representative 
of the Jewish people. As such it enjoys not only the historical right 
to hold and settle in these areas, about which it is not necessary to 
speak at length but simply to study the Bible, but also a right 
enshrined in international law.
12
 
The two other members were Judge Tchia Shapira and Ambassador Alan 
Baker, a former Israeli ambassador to Canada who resides in a settlement 
and whose standing on matters relevant to the mandate of the Levy 
 
 
 11. TALIA SASSON, INTERIM REPORT ON THE SUBJECT OF UNAUTHORIZED OUTPOSTS (2005), 
available at http://www.pmo.gov.il/SiteCollectionDocuments/PMO/Communication/Spokesman/sason2. 
pdf [Hebrew]. An English summary of the report is available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/ 
aboutisrael/state/law/pages/summary%20of%20opinion%20concerning%20unauthorized%20outposts
%20-%20talya%20sason%20adv.aspx. On the backdrop of the establishment of the Levy Committee, 
see generally UNPRECEDENTED: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE 
THE STATUS OF BUILDING IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA [THE WEST BANK] (“THE LEVY COMMITTEE”)—
INTERNATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS (Jan. 2014), http://www.yesh-din.org/userfiles/file/ 
Reports-English/Yesh%20Din%20-%20Chasar%20Takdim%20English%20-%20Web%20%20(1).pdf 
[hereinafter UNPRECEDENTED]. 
 12. HCJ 1661/05 Gaza Coast Regional Council v. The Israeli Knesset 59(2) PD 481 [2005], ¶ 14 
of the dissenting judgment. Unless otherwise mentioned, all translations from Hebrew are ours, OBN 
& RR. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss3/6
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Committee prior to his appointment was no secret. For instance, he is on 
record stating that the “Geneva Convention provisions regarding transfer 
of populations cannot be considered relevant in any event to the Israeli-
Palestinian context.”13 Judge Shapira, daughter of the late Rabbi Shlomo 
Goren, former Chief Military Rabbi and Chief Rabbi of Israel, who served 
in the Tel-Aviv District Court prior to her retirement, has not written on 
such matters. Indeed, her patrimonial lineage is ostensibly irrelevant were 
it not for the following public comment made by a senior member of the 
Likud Party who formerly served as Minister of Finance and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs: 
Did the Prime Minister not know who Edmond Levy is, when he 
appointed him? Edmond Levy was the deputy Mayor of Ramla 
representing the Likud Party. He was a Likud man . . . Do we not 
know who Alan Baker is? The legal adviser to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs during my tenure . . . Do we not know who the 
daughter of Rabbi Goren is? It is clear that this threesome was not 
expected to deliver a Talia Sasson kind of report . . .
14
  
Expert knowledge is based on trust. This is the nexus between 
epistemology and ethics. It is for this reason that the choice of experts 
should be based on their relevant qualifications, not on their 
weltanschauung (worldview). Selecting experts because s/he who makes 
the selection knows they will support a desired outcome is worse than an 
epistemic vice. It is an ethical one.
15
 
The Levy Committee submitted their report on June 21, 2012. The 
essence of their conclusion is twofold: first, from an international legal 
perspective, there is no belligerent occupation of the West Bank. Ergo, the 
law of occupation does not apply and accordingly, there is “no doubt” that 
the Jewish settlements are not illegal.
16
 Second, from the perspective of 
Israeli public law, the establishment of the outposts has enjoyed implied 
governmental consent and is thus legal. This Article focuses solely on the 
first conclusion. This conclusion received scant and generally derisive 
 
 
 13. Alan Baker, The Settlements Issue: Distorting the Geneva Convention and the Oslo Accords, 
JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS (Jan. 5, 2011), http://jcpa.org/article/the-settlements-issue-
distorting-the-geneva-convention-and-the-oslo-accords. This article is referred to in the LCR, supra 
note 9, ¶ 5. Ambassador Baker is currently the director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs at the 
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. 
 14. Joshua Breiner, Minister Shalom Admits: The Justice was Appointed Because He is a Likud 
Man, WALLA! (Dec. 10, 2012), http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/9/2595047 [Hebrew]. 
 15. John Hardwig, Towards an Ethics of Expertise, in PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 83, 97 (Daniel E. Wueste ed., 1994); Kovac, supra note 8, at 407. 
 16. The LCR, supra note 9, ¶ 9. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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reaction from the international legal community.
17
 This reaction is 
understandable insofar as the LCR was dismissive of this community, but 
fails to appreciate not only the political ramifications the LCR may have,
18
 
but also, and more generally, the epistemological and ethical challenges 
such ‘expert committees’ present.  
Our main proposition is three-fold: first, the LCR’s construction of the 
law of belligerent occupation purports to introduce a revolution in the 
discipline: given that there is an overwhelming (and rare) international 
legal consensus that the territories are occupied, that the law of belligerent 
occupation applies and that the settlements are illegal and indeed 
constitute a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the LCR’s 
conclusion purports to advance a paradigmatic shift in international law.
19
 
Second, the government’s attempt to justify the occupation is 
tantamount to a scientific proposition that the sun revolves around the 
earth and equally fails to meet the essential requirements for the 
 
 
 17. International legal scholars reacted to the LCR immediately, albeit briefly after its 
publication in an overwhelmingly critical, even scathing manner. See, e.g., Joseph H. H. Weiler, 
Editorial—Differentiated Statehood? ‘Pre-States’? Palestine@the UN, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2013) 
(the LCR attempted to “kosher the pig”); Iain Scobbie, Justice Levy’s Legal Tinsel: The Recent Israeli 
Report on the Status of the West Bank and Legality of the Settlements, EJIL: TALK!—BLOG OF THE 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/justice-levys-
legal-tinsel-the-recent-israeli-report-on-the-status-of-the-west-bank-and-legality-of-the-settlements 
(the LCR’s arguments are “perverse” and, quoting Jeremy Bentham, “nonsense on stilts”); David 
Kretzmer, Bombshell for the settlement enterprise in Levy report, HA’ARETZ (July 10, 2012), 
http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/bombshell-for-the-settlement-enterprise-in-levy-report-1.450170 
(noting that the report adopts “old, tired and universally rejected arguments”); Kretzmer, Undoing the 
State of Israel, JERUSALEM REPORT (July 24, 2012), http://www.jpost.com/Jerusalem-
Report/Israel/Undoing-the-State-of-Israel; Aeyal Gross, If there are no Palestinians, there’s no Israeli 
occupation, HA’ARETZ (July 10, 2012), http://www.haaretz.com/ news/diplomacy-defense/if-there-
are-no-palestinians-there-s-no-israeli-occupation-1.449988 (“appears to be living in colonial times”); 
Nathaniel Berman, San Remo in Shilo: The Settlements and Legal History, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL 
BLOG (July 19, 2012), http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/san-remo-in-shilo-the-settlements-and-legal-
history (“The Commission’s report operates in something of a parallel legal-historical universe, one in 
which legal evolution stopped sometime in the 1920s”); Yuval Shany & Ido Rosenzweig, Groundless, 
17 ORECH HADIN (THE ATTORNEY) 18, 22 (Oct. 2012) (adopting the LCR would “break the rules of 
the game”) [Hebrew]; Frances Raday & Ido Rosenzweig, The Status of the West Bank Settlements 
Under International Law: A Review of the Conclusions of the Levy Committee, THE ISRAEL 
DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE (Aug. 2, 2012), http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/articles/ the-status-of-the-west-
bank-settlements-under-international-law (the LCR is “unconvincing”); Eliav Lieblich & Shiri Krebs, 
The Outposts Report: War is Peace, Occupation is Freedom, THE ISRAEL DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE 
(July 25, 2012) (equating the LCR, as their title suggests, with Orwell’s ‘newspeak’) [Hebrew]. 
 18. See, e.g., the Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop during a recent visit to Israel appeared 
to be citing from the LCR when she said: “I would like to see which international law has declared 
them [settlements] illegal”, Raphael Ahren, Australia FM: Don’t call settlements illegal under 
international law, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.timesofisrael.com/australia-fm-
dont-call-settlements-illegal-under-international-law. 
 19. The position of Israel on these matters has been far less equivocal and far more 
indeterminate, see infra text and notes 76–80. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss3/6
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generation of a paradigmatic shift: the arguments advanced by the LCR 
reflect, individually and in toto, a colonialist/Orientalist paradigm that has 
been discarded to the dust-bin of history and replaced with a paradigm that 
rests on the right of peoples to self-determination. It is the latter which 
currently enjoys the overwhelming support of the members of the 
international legal community. “The very existence of science,” as Khun 
observed, “depends upon vesting the power to choose between paradigms 
in the members of a special kind of community.”20 The members of the 
Levy Committee attempt to initiate a backward looking revolution that 
rejects the ‘nomos,’ the normative universe which we inhabit, a universe 
comprised of law and narrative and held by interpretive commitments 
regarding what the law means.
21
 This rejection explains the LCR’s failure 
to engage with the vast majority of the members of the international legal 
community. It does not follow that the latter cannot engage with the 
former. This engagement is the business of this Article. 
Third, the LCR’s rejection of the nomos inhabited by the international 
community also explains why it does not advance international legal 
arguments as an apology for power. The latter operates within the structure 
of the international legal discourse, not outside it.
22
 What the LCR does 
advance is a particularly idiosyncratic type of a utopian vision that is 
simultaneously hegemonic and insular: its politics are hegemonic and 
reflect the political position of the Israeli government; its “nomic 
insularity”23 does not. Indeed, Israel has found that working within the 
structure of international law has thus far served its capacity to translate 
this very vision into a reality rather than curtailing it. It is quite likely that 
the Israeli government has not adopted the LCR for this instrumental 
reason. This is a poor reason for its dismissal; the LCR should not merely 
be dismissed, it should be rejected: advancing the right of peoples to self-
determination signifies the compelling general interest of the normative 
universe which we inhabit. It is this interest which resonates the 
 
 
 20. KUHN, supra note 5, at 167. 
 21. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 24–25 (1983–1984). Cover’s pluralistic jurisprudence is of particular relevance to 
international law, see Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 301 (2007). 
 22. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL ARGUMENT (2006) (focusing on the methodology of the discipline, Koskenniemi doomed its 
epistemological foundation: vacillating between the need to verify law’s content by reference to a 
concrete practice and interest of states and the need to impartially determine and apply that very law 
regardless of the practice and interests of states, that is, between apology and utopia, we are already 
always, arguing a political preference). 
 23. Cover, supra note 21, at 28–29.  
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transformative, even redemptive, spirit of the international legal project.
24
 
In order to substantiate this proposition, Part 2 presents the thesis 
advanced by the LCR, inclusive of its substantive and methodological 
bases. Part 3 engages with this thesis: it offers a critical analysis of both its 
substantive and methodological grounds and proceeds to assess them in 
the light of the structural requirements for a paradigmatic shift in, and the 
interpretative commitments of the nomos which we do inhabit. Part 4 
concludes. 
II. THE NOMOS THE LEVY COMMITTEE INHABITS 
“You are a slow learner, Winston.” 
“How can I help it? How can I help but see what is in front of my 
eyes? 
Two and two are four.” 
“Sometimes, Winston. Sometimes they are five. Sometimes they are 
three. 
Sometimes they are all of them at once.  
You must try harder. It is not easy to become sane.” 
—George Orwell, 198425 
“[T]he status of the Judea and Samaria Areas from the perspective of 
international law” is the focus of paragraphs 3-9 of the LCR.26 The 
discussion generates the following inter-related assertions: first, Israel is 
not a belligerent occupying power in the areas.
27
 Second, and alternatively, 
even if its control over the territories were subject to the law of belligerent 
occupation, Article 49 paragraph 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
(GCIV) is irrelevant to the Jewish settlements in the area.
28
 Third, there is 
a legal basis for Israel’s sovereignty over the territory.29 The inevitable 
conclusion is that there is “no doubt that from the perspective of 
international law, the establishment of Jewish settlements in Judea and 
 
 
 24. This part of the proposition adopts, mutatis mutandis, Cover’s ‘redemptive’ nomos, id. at 33–
35, 65. 
 25. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 206–07 (1961). 
 26. The LCR, supra note 9. In paragraph 3 the LCR presents the views on the matter submitted 
to it by representatives of various peace and human rights organizations. In paragraph 4 it presents the 
views of representatives of settlers. Paragraphs 5–9 consist of the Levy Committee’s analysis, 
essentially embracing the latter. 
 27. Id. ¶ 5. 
 28. Id. ¶¶ 5–6. 
 29. Id. ¶¶ 5, 8. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss3/6
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Samaria is not illegal. . .”30 What are the substantive and methodological 
bases for this three-fold thesis? 
The assertion that the West Bank is not occupied territory is based on 
the following two propositions. First, the law of belligerent occupation is 
premised on a relatively short duration. Israel’s presence in and hold over 
the territories, however, has been lasting for decades and “no one can 
foresee when or if it will end. . .”31 Second, laws of belligerent occupation 
are applicable only to territories taken from a sovereign state.
32
 Given that 
the annexation of the area by Jordan lacked a legal basis and Jordan since 
withdrew its claim to sovereignty over the area, the West Bank does not 
qualify as territories taken from a sovereign state.
33
 The LCR provides no 
legal authorities in support of either of these propositions. 
The above assertion obviates the need to consider the application of 
Article 49 paragraph 6 of the GCIV, which provides that “[t]he Occupying 
Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into 
the territory it occupies.”34 The LCR nevertheless decided to posit as an 
alternative ground for the legality of the Jewish settlements in the West 
Bank, what it considers to be “the prevailing view” regarding the 
interpretation of this provision.
35
 This interpretation posits that the 
prohibition on the settlements of citizens of the occupying power in 
occupied territories “was intended to respond to the difficult reality 
imposed on some of the nations during the Second World War, when some 
of their residents were deported and forcibly transferred to the territories 
they had conquered.”36 Read in this light, the LCR concludes that the 
provision is inapplicable to “those who sought to settle in Judea and 
Samaria, who were neither forcibly ‘deported’ nor ‘transferred,’ but who 
rather chose to live there based on their ideology of settling the Land of 
Israel”.37 Methodologically, five sources are cited in support of the 
assertion that this interpretation constitutes “the prevailing view”: the 
 
 
 30. Id. ¶ 5. Compare the English translation of the conclusions in the LCR (¶ 65), supra note 9, 
which reads: “Therefore and according to international law, Israelis have the lawful right to settle in 
Judea and Samaria . . . and the establishment of settlements cannot in and of itself be considered to be 
illegal.” 
 31. Id. ¶ 5. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War art. 49, 
¶ 6, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GCIV]. 
 35. The LCR, supra note 9, ¶ 5. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. ¶ 6. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ICRC Commentary to the GCIV;
38
 a short communication published by 
Eugene Rostow in the ‘Notes and Comments’ section of the 1990 
American Journal of International Law;
39
 a 2009 piece in the Commentary, 
written by David Phillips and citing Julius Stone, albeit without a 
reference;
40
 a 2012 piece written by Alan Baker, a member of the Levy 
Committee and published on the website of the Jerusalem Center for 
Public Affairs;
41
 and a 1987 decision of the Israeli HCJ.
42
 
The third leg of the LCR’s conclusion relative to the status of the 
territories under international law grounds Israel’s claim to sovereign 
rights therein in an historical narrative unfolding along the following 
milestones: (a) the 1917 Balfour Declaration; (b) the reiteration, mutatis 
mutandis, of the Balfour Declaration in the 1920 San Remo Conference, 
and (c) Articles 2 and 6 of the 1922 Mandate for Palestine granted to Great 
Britain by the League of Nations.
43
 Methodologically, the LCR assigns no 
legal significance to the first two documents other than precursors to the 
Mandate. According to the LCR, the latter established that Palestine is the 
national home of the Jewish people and granted only civil and religious 
rights to non-Jewish communities in the area.
44
 
The subsequent milestones comprising the narrative include: (a) the 
1947 General Assembly Resolution 181 (i.e., the partition plan),
45
 which, 
according to the LCR, lacks validity on two grounds. First, it was taken 
ultra-vires in the light of Article 80 of the UN Charter, which provides that 
nothing in the Charter shall alter the rights of states and peoples as 
recognized under mandates.
46
 Second, it was rejected by the Arab States 
and subsequently overwhelmed by the reality of the 1948 war and the 
occupation of the Gaza Strip by Egypt and of the West Bank by Jordan;
47
 
(b) the 1949 armistice lines, as stated in the LCR, were not intended to 
constitute boundaries given the standing of the Arab states;
48
 and (c) the 
 
 
 38. JEAN S. PICTET, COMMENTARY—IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION 
OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN THE TIME OF WAR 283 (1958). 
 39. Responding to Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupations: The Israeli-Occupied 
Territories Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 44 (1990). 
 40. David M. Phillips, The Illegal-Settlements Myth, 128 COMMENTARY 32, 36–37 (Dec. 1, 
2009), available at http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/the-illegal-settlements-myth. Note 
that the LCR cites the year as 2010. 
 41. Baker, supra note 13. 
 42. HCJ 785/87 Afu v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, 42(2) PD 4 [1988]. 
 43. The LCR, supra note 9, ¶ 7. 
 44. Id. 
 45. The Partition Plan, G.A. Res. 181 (II), U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov. 29, 1947). 
 46. The LCR, supra note 9, ¶¶ 7–8. 
 47. Id. ¶ 8. 
 48. Id. 
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1950 illegal annexation of the West Bank by Jordan which, when coupled 
with its subsequent waiver of any claim to sovereign rights over the area, 
has restored, as stated in the LCR, “the original legal status of the 
territory”: the Jews, who had a ‘right of possession’ which they could not 
exercise in view of the result of a war imposed on them and Jordanian 
rule, have returned to their land.
49
 
This narrative leads to the conclusion that Israel has a valid claim to 
sovereignty over the area; that all Israeli governments have taken this 
position and that the only reason Israel refrained from annexing the area 
was “to enable peace negotiations with the representatives of the 
Palestinian people and the Arab states.”50 Indeed, asserts the LCR, Israel 
never regarded itself as an occupying power “in the classic sense of the 
term” and ergo never committed itself to apply the GCIV, settling merely 
for a declaration that it would voluntarily apply its humanitarian 
provisions.
51
 The inescapable conclusion is that its policy has been to 
allow its citizens to reside in the area out of their own free will, subjecting 
their continuous presence to the result of the political negotiations 
process.
52
 
The Levy Committee inhabits a normative universe: its understanding 
of international law is inseparable from a narrative.
53
 That narrative 
unfolds a deep conviction in the exclusive right of the Jewish people to 
sovereignty over the land of Mandatory Palestine. This conviction, indeed 
vision, informs its construction of international law. Transported to the 
normative world, this vision posits a revision of international law. 
Given that alternative visions do exist and that the normative world 
provides the bridge between vision and reality, any attempt to advance a 
revisionist interpretation requires an engagement with alternative visions 
and the meaning they invest in the normative world. Such engagement, as 
tense and wrought with conflicts as it surely is, is nevertheless a sine qua 
non condition for sharing a nomos. An insular vision that fails to be thus 
engaged and insists on living “an entirely idiosyncratic normative life 
would be quite mad.”54 This is not a fruitful vantage point from which to 
advance a revision of our normative universe. It does not follow that 
change is impossible. It simply requires that its introduction relate to the 
 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. ¶ 9. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Cover, supra note 21. 
 54. Id. at 10. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
  
 
 
410 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14:399 
 
 
 
 
“disciplinary matrix of concepts, assumptions, basic laws, proven methods 
and other objects of commitment common to the practitioners of a 
particular discipline or specialty. . .”55 In the case at hand, this requirement 
should have led the members of the Levy Committee to pay a visit to the 
nomos the international legal community actually inhabits. Their failure to 
do so is discussed in the following part. 
III. THE NOMOS THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COMMUNITY ACTUALLY 
INHABITS 
“I see nobody on the road”, said Alice. 
“I only wish I had such eyes”,  
the king remarked with a fretful tone.  
“To be able to see nobody! And at that distance too!” 
Lewis Carroll, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
56
 
The mandate of the Levy Committee did not require it to visit the 
international legal terrain.
57
 It chose to travel that road. This choice is 
meritorious: international law provides the relevant normative framework 
for the determination of the status of a territory and the means and 
methods by which it may be lawfully acquired.
58
 The LCR’s application of 
that normative framework to the status of the West Bank, however, defies 
as it ignores the disciplinary matrix it ostensibly employs. This section 
substantiates this assessment. 
The LCR’s proposition that the West Bank does not qualify as a 
territory under belligerent occupation rested on two beliefs. The first is 
that the international legal regime of belligerent occupation is premised on 
a short duration, whereas the Israeli control over the area has no end in 
sight.
59
 Neither doctrine nor principle supports this line of reasoning. 
 
 
 55. Christopher G. A. Bryant, Kuhn, Paradigms and Sociology, 26 BRIT. J. SOC. 354, 354 (1975) 
(emphasis omitted) (referring to KUHN, supra note 5, at 181–87). 
 56. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING 
GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 206 (Bodley Head, 1974). 
 57. The Levy Committee’s mandate is to recommend “actions to be taken in order to regularize 
the construction [of settlements], if possible—or to remove it,” and to “promise a due process to the 
investigation of real estate issues in the territory, in accordance with principles of justice and decency 
of the Israeli legal and administrative system.” See the LCR, supra note 9, ¶ 1. Translation has slightly 
different wording, “Actions to be taken where possible to legalize or remove construction—all in 
accordance with the aforementioned policy.” 
 58. UNPRECEDENTED, supra note 11, part A.1. In the context of regulating the acquisition of 
territory, UNPRECEDENTED properly refers to ROBERT YEWDALL JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF 
TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1963). 
 59. See supra text between notes 30–31. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss3/6
  
 
 
 
 
2015] THE ASTRO-NOMOS 411 
 
 
 
 
It is undoubtedly true that the regime is premised on a relatively short 
duration. It is equally true that the indefinite duration of the Israeli control 
over the territory defies that premise.
60
 It does not follow, however, that 
the mere duration of a regime (a political phenomenon) transforms its 
normative classification and affects the applicable legal framework.
61
 The 
suggestion that it does belongs to the alchemy of law and falls outside the 
matrix of the discipline. It is little wonder that no legal authority was 
advanced by the LCR to support it. There is none. 
Within the applicable normative matrix, the notion that an occupation 
is a temporary form of control that may not generate permanent results is 
undisputed and indeed underlies its two other tenets: the principle that 
occupation does not confer title
62
 and the conservation principle.
63
 The law 
of occupation does provide for the provisional status of the regime but 
fails to set time limits on its duration.
64
 Article 6 of the GCIV is the only 
provision that addresses directly the issue of the duration of an occupation, 
providing for the continued applicability of only some of the Convention’s 
provisions.
65
 Reflecting the drafters’ premise that an occupation would 
normally be of a short duration, this provision may generate counter-
productive results in cases of prolonged occupation. Once it became clear 
that this premise was defied by reality, this provision was abrogated: 
Article 3(b) of the First Additional Protocol (API) provides for the 
 
 
 60. Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal M. Gross & Keren Michaeli, Illegal Occupation: Framing the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 551, 597–605 (2005). 
 61. Even if it were determined that the occupation is illegal, the applicable legal framework 
would continue to apply. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 
I.C.J. 16, 52 (June 21). There are various views relative to the question when does an occupation end, 
but an indefinite duration is not one of them. See, e.g., Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross (ICRC), Expert 
Meeting: Occupation and other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory 26–33 (Tristan Ferraro 
ed., 2012), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4094.pdf. 
 62. The prohibition on annexation of an occupied territory is the normative consequence of this 
principle. See, e.g., SURYA PRAKASH SHARMA, TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION, DISPUTES AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (1997). 
 63. The conservation principle, precluding the occupying power from introducing major systemic 
changes in the occupied territory, is articulated in the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631, and further detailed in GCIV, supra note 34, 
art. 64. This preclusion highlights the distinction between temporary occupation and sovereignty. See, 
e.g., Jean L. Cohen, The Role of International Law in Post-Conflict Constitution-Making: Toward a 
Jus Post Bellum for “Interim Occupations,” 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 496, 498–99 (2006–2007). 
 64. This lacuna is discussed in Orna Ben-Naftali, Belligerent Occupation: A Plea for the 
Establishment of an International Supervisory Mechanism, in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 538, 546–48 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2012). 
 65. According to the text of GCIV, supra note 34, art. 6, if an occupation lasts longer than one 
year after the general close of military operations, 9 of the 32 articles comprising section III of the 
convention (arts. 47–78) cease to apply: arts. 48, 50, 54–58, 60, 78. 
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application of the law of occupation in toto until the termination of the 
occupation.
66
 Indeed, even the Israeli HCJ applies the provisions of the 
GCIV otherwise precluded by Article 6.
67
 
Prolonged belligerent occupations are rare. They are an anomaly 
attesting to the failure of political processes. A political anomaly is not to 
be confused with a legal anomaly. Prolonged occupations do not vitiate 
the relevant normative paradigm, and indeed call for extra vigilance in its 
application.
68
 
The applicability of the law of belligerent occupation to prolonged 
occupations has never been questioned by any known primary or 
secondary source of international law. It is particularly instructive that not 
only international judicial, quasi-judicial and political institutions
69
 but 
also Israeli authorities resort to it as a matter of course. The argument of 
the LCR was never made by any Israeli authority responding to petitions 
emanating from the OPT. This argument was advanced in the petition of 
the Gaza Coast Regional Council and unequivocally rejected by the Court: 
The petitioners deny the claim that the area is under temporary 
belligerent occupation. They argue that the Israeli settlement in the 
area relied on a continuous representation of the Israeli 
governments, that it is a permanent settlement in one of the grounds 
of the land of Israel [. . . However,] the normative reality is eviction 
 
 
 66. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 3(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter API]. It should further be noted in the context of the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (OPT), that even the answer to the question whether the military operations have ended is 
disputed: the commentary cites the Rapporteur of Committee III as defining the “general close of 
military operations” as “when the last shot has been fired.” PICTET, supra note 38, at 62. Given that the 
vicious cycle of violence in the OPT perpetuates shots being fired, it may well be argued that ‘the 
general close of military operations’ is yet to dawn. 
 67. E.g., article 78 of the GCIV was applied by the HCJ in HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. Commander of 
the IDF in Judea and Samaria 56(6) PD 352 [2002]. Note that while Article 78 provides less for the 
obligations and more for the rights of the Occupying Power, endowing it with the power to subject 
protected persons to assigned residence and to internment, the fact remains that the Court applied this 
provision, regardless of Article 6. 
 68. If anything, prolonged occupation underscores the need to interpret specific provisions in a 
manner that would ensure that the rights of the occupied population provided for within the normative 
framework are not further jeopardized. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence 
of South Africa in Namibia, supra note 61, ¶ 111; Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 60, at 
612; Orna Ben-Naftali, ‘A La Recherche Du Temp Perdu’: Rethinking Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention in the Light of the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory Advisory Opinion, 38 ISR. L. REV. 211, 216 (2005); Roberts, supra note 39, at 
53–56. 
 69. See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9) [hereinafter Construction of the Wall]; G.A. Res. 
55/132, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/132 (Dec. 8, 2000); infra notes 97–98, 100–02. 
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from an area of belligerent occupation. The nature of such an area is 
that Israelis’ presence in it is temporary . . . the possibility of 
eviction occurring one day hangs over the Israeli’s head at all 
times.
70
 
The notion that a prolonged occupation vitiates the law of belligerent 
occupation is not merely unfounded in terms of doctrine but also turns 
principle on its head; in attempting to transform a political anomaly into a 
legal justification, the LCR posits that a wrong can and does make a right
71
 
and further responds in the positive to the otherwise incredulous biblical 
question: “Hast thou killed, and also taken possession?”72 
It should finally be noted that the above-cited judicial decision was 
made pursuant to a political decision to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and 
dismantle the settlements. Up to that decision, Israeli authorities equated 
the ‘temporary’ with the ‘indefinite’.73 The interplay between the 
‘temporary’ and the ‘indefinite’ violates one of the basic tenets of the 
regime, impacts negatively its other tenets and may indeed render the 
whole regime illegal, but this illegality is an effect of the applicable legal 
paradigm, not of its absence.
74
 
The second leg on which the LCR’s proposition rests is a certain 
reading of common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, according to 
which the West Bank does not qualify as a territory under belligerent 
occupation. This reading is inspired by a narrative that posits Jewish 
ownership of the land since time immemorial and attempts to turn the 
vision into a normative reality. This view has long been rejected by the 
international legal community.
75
 
 
 
 70. Gaza Coast, supra note 12, ¶¶ 28, 115. 
 71. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 29 (1978) (analyzing the case of Riggs v. 
Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889) in which the court of appeals of New York ruled that a man may not 
inherit his grandfather’s estate after murdering him in order to hasten the inheritance). 
 72. 1 Kings 21:19 (King James). In a similar vein, the HCJ ruled that the Israeli use of quarries in 
the West Bank is included in the occupying force’s obligation to the development of the territory, due 
to the prolonged duration of the occupation. HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din—Volunteers for Human Rights v. 
Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank et al., (Dec. 26, 2011), Published in Nevo, ¶ 10. For a 
critique see Aeyal Gross, Israel is Exploiting the Resources of the Occupied West Bank, HA’ARETZ 
(Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-is-exploiting-the-resources-of-the-
occupied-west-bank-1.403988. 
 73. Meir Shamgar, Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military Government—The Initial 
Stage, in MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967–1980 13, 43 
(Meir Shamgar ed., 1982). 
 74. See Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 60. 
 75. See, e.g., Construction of the Wall, supra note 69, ¶ 95; Kathleen A. Cavanaugh, Selective 
Justice: The Case of Israel and the Occupied Territories, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 943–46 (2002–
2003). 
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The first paragraph of Common article 2 provides that “. . . the present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.” The 
second paragraph provides that “[t]he Convention shall also apply to all 
cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting 
Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.”76 
The notion that the GCIV is inapplicable to the areas conquered in 
1967 is based on a cumulative reading of the two paragraphs and posits 
that since Jordan was not a lawful sovereign in the West Bank (and that 
Egypt never claimed sovereign title over the Gaza Strip), the territories 
were not taken from “a High Contracting Party” and ergo, Israel is not 
obligated to apply the GCIV.
77
 
Israel’s official position embraced this interpretation and maintained 
that it is under no obligation to apply the GCIV to the territories,
78
 but that 
it would unilaterally undertake to observe its humanitarian provisions.
79
 
This position is more nuanced than the position of the LCR in that it refers 
solely to the applicability of the GCIV and does not deny that the territory 
is subject to the customary laws of belligerent occupation—laws which 
apply with respect to territories that were not taken from “a High 
Contracting Party”—primarily the provisions of part C of the 1907 Hague 
Regulations.
80
 The Israeli HCJ, while routinely applying both The Hague 
 
 
 76. GCIV, supra note 34, art. 2. 
 77. Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 
3 ISR. L. REV. 279 (1968); Shamgar, supra note 73, at 33–34. The LCR fails to refer to these 
authorities. 
 78. Initially, the territory included the West Bank (except East Jerusalem which was annexed, see 
infra note 176) and the Gaza Strip. Following the unilateral withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip in 
2005 (the “Disengagement Plan”, see Gaza Coast, supra note 12, ¶ 16) there is an ongoing debate 
whether or not it is still under effective control. See, e.g., Yuval Shany, Binary Law Meets Complex 
Reality: The Occupation of Gaza Debate, 41 ISR. L. REV. 68 (2008); Solon Solomon, Occupied or 
Not: The Question of Gaza’s Legal Status after the Israeli Disengagement, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 59 (2011). 
 79. Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories, 1 ISR. 
Y.B. HUM. RTS. 117, 266 (1971). The LCR, ¶ 9, reiterates this point and refers to a few judgments of 
the HCJ which support it, upon concluding its discussion of the international legal perspective on the 
legality of the settlements. 
 80. Note that given that it is generally accepted that the Geneva Conventions enjoy customary 
status, the distinction Israel draws between The Hague and the Geneva Law seems to generate no 
normative effect. On the customary status of the Geneva Convention see, e.g., JEAN-MARIE 
HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 
VOLUME 1: RULES (reprinted with corrections 2009); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1966 I.C.J. 226, 257–58 (July 8). The LCR’s observation, in ¶ 9, that 
Israel did not incorporate the GCIV into its internal legislation, implies that the GCIV is not customary 
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and the Geneva Law, has nevertheless refrained from determining the 
applicability de jure of the GCIV.
81
 Yet, even this position was rejected by 
the relevant institutions of the international community,
82
 including the 
ICJ,
83
 the ICRC,
84
 and by the vast majority of international legal 
scholars.
85
 The LCR is silent about the rejection of its position, the 
grounds on which it is based and the scope and nature of its sources. 
The major—though not the only—reason for the less than splendid 
isolation of the Israeli position (and a fortiori albeit implicitly the rejection 
of the LCR’s argument) is that the reading of the first two paragraphs of 
common article 2 as providing alternative rather than cumulative 
conditions for the Conventions’ application advances the humanitarian 
objectives of the Conventions. Given that the main impetus for the Geneva 
law was to advance greater humanitarian protection than hitherto provided, 
an interpretation which supports this objective is preferred to one that does 
not. Israel’s counter–argument that the GCIV is designed not only to 
protect the humanitarian interests but also the interests of the ousted 
sovereign,
86
 fails to distinguish between the primary and the secondary 
purposes of the law and to give preference to the former. Indeed, given the 
major changes Israel introduced in the area, primarily due to the 
“settlement enterprise,”87 its concern over the conservation principle can 
hardly be perceived as reflecting good faith. The fact that its position 
omits the Palestinian claim to sovereignty over the territory underscores 
the point. 
 
 
law. It fails to mention the overwhelming support of the international legal community for the opposite 
view. 
 81. For a summary of the Israeli stand see Gaza Coast, supra note 12, ¶¶ 4–5. 
 82. E.g., G.A. Res. 32/91 [A-C], U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/91 [A-C] (Dec. 13, 1977); S.C. Res. 237, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/237 (June 14, 1967); infra notes 97–102.  
 83. Construction of the Wall, supra note 69, ¶ 101, states as follows: “Israel and Jordan were 
parties to that convention when the 1967 armed conflict broke out. The Court accordingly finds that 
than convention is applicable in the Palestinian territories which before the conflict lay to the east of 
the Green Line and which, during that conflict, were occupied by Israel, there being no need for any 
enquiry into the precise prior status of those territories”. 
 84. PICTET, supra note 38, at 22. 
 85. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 39, at 64; ESTHER R. COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELI-
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 1967–1982 53 (1985); infra note 103. 
 86. Shamgar—Observance, supra note 79, at 265–66. 
 87. The “settlements enterprise” is a common coinage in Hebrew to connote the organized 
manner in which Jewish citizens of Israel are relocated to settlements in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory. It is also being used in English, see, e.g., Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Jewish Messianism, Religious 
Zionism and Israeli politics: The Impact of Gush Emunim, 23 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES (1987); Alon 
Ben-Meir, The Settlement Enterprise has Run its Course, THE WORLD POST (Sept. 27, 2010), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alon-benmeir/the-settlement-enterprise_b_740710.html; Jodi Rudoren, 
1,500 Units to be Added in Settlements, Israel says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2013/10/31/world/middleeast/israel-approves-1500-new-apartments-in-east-jerusalem.html. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
  
 
 
416 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14:399 
 
 
 
 
Finally, had the LCR’s argument been accepted, the question of where 
the authority of the military commander, representing the occupying 
power, derives from would have to be addressed. There are two possible 
answers to this question: he has been acting ultra-vires or Israel is the 
lawful sovereign. In the nomos inhabited by the members of the Levy 
Committee, the latter is the answer. This reading of the law is informed by 
a strong narrative grounded in the divine promise of the land to the Jewish 
people. That very narrative was presented to the HCJ in the 1979 landmark 
case
88
 known as Elon Moreh.
89
 The Court, in rejecting the authority of the 
military commander to requisite land in order to establish a settlement on 
grounds other than military needs, refused to impregnate the law with this 
narrative. It determined that had the argument that the law of belligerent 
occupation does not apply been accepted, the inescapable conclusion 
would be: the military commander acted without authority and the land 
should be returned to its lawful Palestinian owners.
90
 In hundreds of 
judgments since, the HCJ unequivocally held that the sole source of the 
legal authority of the military commander is the law of belligerent 
occupation.
91
 In the nomos inhabited by the international community, 
inclusive of the HCJ, the applicable legal paradigm is the law of 
belligerent occupation. It is into this alternative nomos
92
 that the Levy 
Committee felt compelled to step in hoping to put to rest any legal 
challenge to the Jewish settlements
93
 in the West Bank. 
Even if the GCIV were to apply, posits the LCR, the ‘prevailing view’ 
is that Article 49 paragraph 6 providing that “the Occupying Power shall 
not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory 
it occupies,”94 is inapplicable to the Jewish settlers in the West Bank.95 
This is so because the settlers are “persons who sought to settle in Judea 
and Samaria not because they were ‘deported’ or ‘exiled’ thereto by force, 
 
 
 88. Ronen Shamir, “Landmark Cases” and the Reproduction of Legitimacy: The Case of Israel’s 
High Court of Justice, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 781 (1990). 
 89. HCJ 390/79 Dweikat et al. v. Government of Israel et al., 34(1) PD 1 [1979]. 
 90. Id. at 12. See also David Kretzmer, Bombshell for the Settlement Enterprise in Levy Report, 
HA’ARETZ, July 10, 2012, available at http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/bombshell-for-the-settlement-
enterprise-in-levy-report-1.450170. 
 91. UNPRECEDENTED, supra note 11, annex A, lists more than 60 examples [Hebrew]. 
 92. As noted at supra text and accompanying text 34–42, the LCR offers an interpretation of the 
GCIV, art. 49(6), as an alternative to its main proposition regarding the inapplicability of the entire law 
of belligerent occupation. 
 93. Note further that much like that famous rose that would still be a rose even if called by any 
other name, under the international law of belligerent occupation a settlement is still a settlement even 
if it is called an outpost. 
 94. GCIV, supra note 34, art. 49(6). 
 95. See supra text between notes 33–37. 
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but because of their worldview—the settlement of the Land of Israel”.96 
The leap from this ‘worldview’ to the ‘prevailing view’ in international 
law reflects little more than wishful thinking. The ‘prevailing view’ of the 
Security Council,
97
 the General Assembly,
98
 the International Court of 
Justice,
99
 all of the United Nations Expert Committees, including the 
Human Rights Committee,
100
 the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights
101
 and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination,
102
 and the overwhelming majority of international legal 
experts
103
 is that the settlements signify the transfer of residents of the 
occupying power to the occupied territory, a transfer which the provision 
 
 
 96. The LCR, supra note 9, ¶ 6. 
 97. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 465, U.N. Doc. S/RES/465 (Mar. 1, 1980). 
 98. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2253 (ES–V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2253 (ES–V) (July 4, 1967) from 1967, 
through G.A. Res. 67/229, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/229 (Apr. 9, 2013) of 2013. A full list of over 200 
decisions is provided in UNPRECEDENTED, supra note 11, appendix B. 
 99. Construction of the Wall, supra note 69, ¶ 120. 
 100. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (Aug. 18, 1998); Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations 
of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 5, 2003); Human Rights 
Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3 (Sep. 10, 2010). 
 101. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Israel, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.27 (Dec. 4, 
1998); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Israel, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.90 (May 23, 
2003); U.N. Doc. E/C.12/ISR/CO/3 (Dec. 16, 2011). 
 102. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Israel, U.N. Doc. A/49/18, ¶¶ 73–91 (Aug. 
19, 1994); Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Israel, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.45 (Mar. 
30, 1998); Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Israel, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/ISR/CO/13 (June 
14, 2007); Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Israel, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-16 
(Mar. 9, 2012). 
 103. See, Antonio Cassese, Legal Considerations on the International Status of Jerusalem, 3 
PALESTINE Y.B. INT’L L. 13 (1986); Roberts, supra note 39, at 83–86; Joseph H. H. Weiler, Israel, the 
Territories and International Law: When Doves are Hawks, in ISRAEL AMONG THE NATIONS 381 
(Alfred E. Kellermann et al. eds., 1998); James Crawford, Opinion: Third Party Obligations with 
respect to Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, TUC (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.tuc.org.uk/tucfiles/342/LegalOpinionIsraeliSettlements.pdf; EYAL BENVENISTI, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2d ed., 2012); Yoram Dinstein, The International Legal Status 
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—1998, 28 ISR. Y. B. HUM. RTS. 37 (1999); ORNA BEN-NAFTALI 
& YUVAL SHANY, INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE (2006) [Hebrew]; DAVID 
KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED 
TERRITORIES (2002). See also Scobbie; Kretzmer—Undoing the State of Israel; Gross; Raday & 
Rosenzweig; Lieblich & Krebs, supra note 17. 
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prohibits regardless of its motive. This prohibition is customary
104
 and is 
thus applicable even if the international legal community were to accept, 
miraculously, the LCR’s position concerning the inapplicability of the 
GCIV.
105
 
The LCR, alas, fails to mention, let alone engage with any of these 
sources. It does cite the ICRC commentary as a source supporting its 
interpretation of article 49.
106
 The commentary, however, offers no such 
support and indeed, in the light of the conservation principle,
107
 regards 
any demographic changes as prohibited.
108
 
In this context too, the LCR weaves a self-serving temporal web: in 
tracing the roots of the prohibition to Nazi Judenrein policies it seeks to 
suggest the audacity of a comparison between the latter and Jewish 
settlements in the OPT.
109
 The commentary, however, clarifies that the 
prohibition on such practices predates the Second World War, and indeed 
was considered customary before the Geneva Conventions came into 
force.
110
 It further sheds light on its meaning and scope: its application is 
not restricted to forced transfer or deportation; the words ‘transfer’ and 
‘deport’ “do not refer to the movement of protected persons but to the 
nationals of the occupying Power”, and the paragraph “provides protected 
persons with a valuable safeguard”.111 
A proper reading of the provision in the light of the commentary, 
generated already in 1967 the advice given by the then legal adviser to the 
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Theodore Meron, clarifies the 
following: (a) “civilian settlement in the administered territories 
 
 
 104. Rule 130 of the ICRC’s guide to customary IHL states that “States may not deport or transfer 
parts of their own civilian population into a territory they occupy,” HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, 
supra note 80, at 462. 
 105. See Scobbie, supra note 17. 
 106. The LCR, supra note 9, ¶ 5. 
 107. The conservation principle is articulated in art. 43 of the Hague Regulations, supra note 63, 
vesting the occupying power with the authority “to take all measures in his power to restore, and 
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the 
laws in force in the country” (emphasis added). The conservation principle thus imposes on the 
occupying power the duty to respect the existing legal, economic and socio-political institutions in the 
territory. This principle has its origins in the preservation of the sovereignty of the ousted authority. 
For discussion, see, e.g., Nehal Bhuta, The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation, 16 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 721 (2005); Ben-Naftali—Belligerent Occupation, supra note 64, at 544–46. 
 108. PICTET, supra note 38, at 283. 
 109. See the LCR’s reference to Julius Stone, supra note 9, ¶ 5. 
 110. PICTET, supra note 38, at 279. See also GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 227 
(1968); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Deportation and Transfer of Civilians in Time of War, 26 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 469, 480, 482–85, 500 (1993–1994). 
 111. PICTET, supra note 38, at 283. 
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contravenes explicit provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention”; (b) the 
prohibition on such settlement is ‘categorical’, that is, “not conditional 
upon the motives for the transfer or its objectives”; and (c) “Its purpose is 
to prevent settlement in occupied territory of citizens of the occupying 
state.”112 This position was hushed and ignored. 
Two later legislative developments signify the importance the 
international community attaches to the prohibition, in the process 
shedding a dim light on both the Jewish settlement in the OPT and on the 
LCR’s interpretation: the first is reflected in article 85(4)(a) of API,113 
which has transformed a violation of this prohibition from a breach of the 
GCIV into a ‘grave breach’ thereof. This transformation was deemed 
necessary, according the ICRC Commentary “because of the possible 
consequences for the population of the territory concerned from a 
humanitarian point of view.”114 The second development is articulated in 
article 8(2)(b))viii) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICCSt). It designates as a war crime, “[t]he transfer, directly or indirectly, 
by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the 
territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the 
population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory.”115 
While concerned with individual responsibility, it does not, as noted by the 
International Law Commission, “relieve a state of any responsibiliti[es] 
under international law for an act or omission attribut[ed] to it.”116 The 
difference in the wordings of these two provisions is significant: in the 
provision in the ICCSt, the words “willfully and in violation of the 
Convention or the Protocol” were omitted and the words “directly or 
indirectly” were inserted 
 
 
 112. Memorandum from Theodore Meron, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Adi 
Yafeh, Political Secretary to the Prime Minister, Settlement in the administered territories (classified 
as “top secret”, Sept. 18, 1967), available at http://www.soas.ac.uk/lawpeacemideast/resources/ 
file48485.pdf. This memorandum was brought to the attention of the committee by the Association for 
Civil Rights in Israel. Tamar Feldman, The Position of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel 
(ACRI) (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/ACRI-position-outposts-
190412-ENG.pdf. 
 113. API, supra note 66, art. 85(4) reads: “[T]he following shall be regarded as grave breaches of 
this Protocol, when committed wilfully and in violation of the Conventions or the Protocol: (a) the 
transfer by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or 
the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside 
this territory, in violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Convention.” 
 114. CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 
TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 1000 (Yves Sandoz et al., eds., 1987). 
 115. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(b)(viii), July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 183/9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
 116. Henckaerts, supra note 110, at 488 (citing the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/RES/95(I) (Dec. 11, 1946)). 
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to clearly express that indirect transfer policies are also covered . . . 
such as confiscation laws, military or other protection of unlawful 
settlements, as well as economic and financial measures such as 
incentives, subsidies, exoneration of taxes and permits issued on a 
discriminatory basis . . . the perpetrator does not need any particular 
motive or special intent other than the intent of transferring parts of 
the population of the Occupying Power into the occupied 
territory.
117
 
Israel is neither a party to the API nor to the ICCSt in large measure due to 
these provisions.
118
 The ICCSt, however, clearly indicate the “prevailing 
view” of international law. The LCR could have engaged with this view 
from a critical position.
119
 Instead, it chose to reverse it. 
It is in this light that one should read the concluding paragraph of the 
LCR’s exposé of the international legal perspective. The Committee, 
reiterating Israel’s unilateral commitment to apply the humanitarian 
provisions of the GCIV without thereby admitting any legal obligation to 
do so, proceeds to state that “consequently Israel had adopted a policy that 
allows Israelis to live in the area out of their own free will according to the 
rules established by the Israeli government and subject to the review of the 
Israeli legal system.”120 This conclusion alludes to the prohibition imposed 
on the occupying power to “transfer directly or indirectly”121 parts of its 
population to the occupied area, and appears to posit that the case of the 
 
 
 117. Michael Cottier, Article 8(2)(b)(viii), in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 362, 369 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed., 2008). 
 118. Israel’s opposition to, inter-alia, art. 85(4)(a) of API, supra note 66, should probably be 
construed as persistent objection. See Christopher Greenwood, Terrorism and Humanitarian Law: The 
Debate over Additional Protocol I, 19 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 187 (1989); Christopher C. Burris, 
Comment: Re-examining the Prisoner of War Status of PLO Fedayeen, 22 N. C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 943, 976 (1997). On its position regarding the ICCSt, see Daniel Benoliel & Ronen Perry, Israel, 
Palestine, and the ICC, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 73 (2010–2011); Yaël Ronen, ICC Jurisdiction over Acts 
Committed in the Gaza Strip: Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute and Non-state Entities, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. 
CT. 3 (2010); Yuval Shany, In Defence of Functional Interpretation of Article 12(3) of the Rome 
Statute: A Response to Yaël Ronen, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. CT. 329 (2010). 
 119. See, e.g., Michael Bothe, War Crimes, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 379, 413 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002); Ariel Zemach, 
Fairness and Moral Judgments in International Criminal Law: The Settlement Provision in the Rome 
Statute, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 895 (2002–2003); Ayelet Levy, Comments: Israel Rejects Its 
Own Offspring: The International Criminal Court, 22 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 207 (1999–
2000). 
 120. The LCR, supra note 9, ¶ 9. This point resonates the LCR’s dismissal of the relevance of art. 
49(6) of GCIV, supra note 34, inter-alia on the grounds that the settlers were motivated to settle there 
“because of their world-view—the settlement of the land of Israel.” The LCR, supra note 9, ¶ 6. 
 121. Art. 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute, supra note 115; see also rule 130 of the ICRC’s guide 
to customary IHL, supra note 80. 
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settlements involves neither kind: from each settler’s point of view, the 
decision to reside in a settlement is but an expression of free will. 
There is no dispute that Israel did not force its citizens to settle in the 
West Bank. Yet, the dialectical relationship between consciousness and 
experience tends to draw a very thin line between being coerced and being 
coaxed. In the case at hand, the text of “individual free will” is to be read 
in the context of material governmental intervention. 
There are currently over 550,000 settlers living in the West Bank 
(including approximately 200,000 in East Jerusalem and its surrounding 
areas).
122
 Some of them surely gravitated to the territory on ideological 
grounds and would probably have done that without governmental 
incentives. These incentives, however, explain the attraction of the area to 
the vast majority of Jews residing in the West Bank: coming from the 
lower socio-economic strata,
123
 the lure of subsidized housing located not 
too far from urban centers, new infrastructure coupled with better public 
education, health and welfare services that in Israel proper are undergoing 
privatization, and lower taxes, is a major consideration for settling in the 
occupied territory.
124
 This data suggests that where the LCR sees free will 
in pure form, a critical examination discloses a disciplinary matrix of law, 
ideology and political economy. 
The construction of a legal status for the settlements is the raison d’être 
of the Levy Committee. It explains not only its reading of article 46 
paragraph 6 of the GCIV but also its determination regarding the 
irrelevance of the international law of belligerent occupation to the West 
Bank. However, both are but specific indicators of an “entire constellation 
of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by members of a given 
 
 
 122. The figures vary depending on their source, and range between 500,000 and 650,000. See 
Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook—Middle East: The West Bank, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf_we.pdf. The numbers are 
slightly higher according to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, but its report does not contain 
specific data for East Jerusalem. See Statistical Abstract of Israel 2013 138, http://www1.cbs.gov.il/ 
reader/shnaton/templ_shnaton.html?num_tab=st02_19x&CYear=2013. 
 123. Danny Gutwein, Comments on the Class Foundations of the Occupation, 24 THEORY & 
CRITICISM 203 (2004) [Hebrew]. 
 124. Id. at 206. See also ARIELLA AZOULAY & ADI OPHIR, THE ONE-STATE CONDITION: 
OCCUPATION AND DEMOCRACY IN ISRAEL/PALESTINE 81 (Tal Haran trans., 2013). Various 
mechanisms facilitate these economic benefits, including the classification of numerous settlements as 
“national high priority area,” a category traditionally intended for the socio-economic periphery within 
the green line in numbers. See http://www.haaretz.co.il/st/inter/Hheb/images/adifut2013.pdf. See also 
The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Situation Report: The State of Human Rights in Israel and 
the OPT 2012, 77–83 (Dec. 2012), http://www.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ACRI-
Situation-Report-2012-ENG.pdf. 
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community.”125 Lurking behind the LCR’s reading of the law is a vision. 
The vision is of an international law that vindicates Israel’s exclusive 
sovereignty over the area. That international law, which ostensibly 
recognized the Jewish people’s right to self-determination in Palestine, 
and only its right, is found in quasi-legal and legal documents from the 
early 1920s, primarily the 1922 Mandate for Palestine.
126
 The clock, it 
would seem, has not just stopped ticking for the Palestinians; from the 
LCR’s perspective of international law, it has actually turned back to the 
era of colonialism, and, given the specificity of the chronotopy,
127
 of 
“Orientalism.”128 This is the context which illuminates the text of the 
Balfour Declaration, the San Remo Resolution and the British Mandate. 
Noblesse oblige: The Balfour Declaration was made in a letter written 
by one nobleman, Lord Arthur James Balfour, then Foreign Secretary of 
Great Britain, to another, Baron Walter Rothschild, son of the first Jewish 
peer in England. It is perhaps no coincidence that the paradigmatic 
example Edward Said uses to explain the specific juxtaposition of 
knowledge and power that constitutes the Orientalist nomos is a lecture 
given by the very same Lord Balfour to justify the need for Britain to 
continue to exercise control over Egypt.
129
 The then dominant 
international legal paradigm, that “Gentle Civilizer of Nations,”130 
provided the colonialist enterprise with a seemingly objective, scientific 
apology for “the continuing subjugation of various regions of the 
world.”131 Within the Orientalist paradigm, the indigenous population of 
Palestine, not European Jewry, was construed as the “other.” The 
recognition of the latter’s right to build “a national home in Palestine,” 
simultaneously preserving their political rights in Europe,
132
 was not 
perceived as an anomaly. 
 
 
 125. KUHN, supra note 5, at 175. 
 126. See supra text between notes 42–44. 
 127. See generally MIKHAIL M. BAKHTIN, Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel, in 
THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS 84, 84 (Michael Holquist ed., Michael Holquist & Caryl 
Emerson trans., 1981). 
 128. See generally EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (Penguin Classics 2003). 
 129. Id. at 32. 
 130. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960 (2004). 
 131. Jean Allain, Orientalism and International Law: The Middle East as the Underclass of the 
International Legal Order, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 391, 391 (2004), cited in Victor Kattan, Palestine 
and International Law: An Historical Overview, in THE PALESTINE QUESTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 3 (Victor Kattan ed., 2008). 
 132. The Balfour Declaration, San Remo Resolution and Mandate for Palestine all incorporate 
approximately the same phrase: “[I]t being clearly understood that nothing should be done which 
might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.” See 
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Yet, even then, there was a whiff of change. The demise of the colonial 
project is attributable to a myriad of factors, including unease with the gap 
between self-proclaimed Western values of self-determination and 
equality and the dispossession and subjugation of the rest of the world. 
Europe remained the center of gravity, but it could no longer retain the 
identification of the European order with the international one. 
Membership in the League of Nations, which for the first time included 
non-European states on a footing of equality with European states, is one 
indicator that an alternative paradigm was emerging. In this context, the 
success of the Zionist movement to secure recognition in “the historical 
connection of the Jewish People with Palestine” and in the “establishment 
in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,”133 should be read 
against its failure to substitute the term “title” for “connection” and to 
secure Palestine as the national home of the Jewish people.
134
 The 
interpretation offered by then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston 
Churchill, in his White Paper further signifies this change: the Balfour 
Declaration, he clarified, never contemplated that “Palestine as a whole 
should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home 
should be founded in Palestine.”135 This 1922 reading of the meaning of 
the Mandate and its antecedent documents, as understood by the 
Mandatory Power, should have caused the members of the Levy 
Committee to at least pause before marshaling Article 80 of the UN 
Charter as a ground for invalidating the Partition Plan.
136
 Later 
developments relative to the colonialist paradigm should have propelled 
 
 
Mandate for Palestine, League of Nations Doc. C.529M.314 1922 VI (Aug. 12, 1922), available at 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/2FCA2C68106F11AB05256BCF007BF3CB; Lord Arthur James 
Balfour, Foreign Office, The Balfour Declaration (photo. reprint), (1917), in THE ARAB-ISRAELI 
CONFLICT READINGS AND DOCUMENTS 884, 885 (John Norton Moore ed., 1977), available at 
http://www.icsresources.org/content/primarysourcedocs/BalfourDeclaration.pdf; The San Remo 
Resolution, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Apr. 25, 1920), http://www.cfr.org/israel/san-remo-
resolution/p15248. 
 133. See Mandate for Palestine, supra note 132. 
 134. See Proposals for Palestine Mandate, Mar. 20, 1919, U.K. National Archives F.O. 608/100 
(emphasis added), cited in Victor Kattan, Palestine and International Law: An Historical Overview, in 
THE PALESTINE QUESTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW xxxii (Victor Kattan ed., 2008) 
 135. See COLONIAL OFFICE, ENCLOSURE IN NO. 5: BRITISH POLICY IN PALESTINE, 1922, Cmd. 
1700, at 18. See generally Kattan, supra 131, at xxv. 
 136. See supra text between notes 44–46. Paragraph 1 of article 80 of the U.N. Charter provides: 
“Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements . . . nothing in this Chapter shall 
be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or 
the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may 
respectively be parties.” For an additional critique of the LCR’s reading of the Partition Plan, see infra 
text between notes 143–50. 
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them to rethink the validity of their own astro-nomos. In such rethinking, 
alas, they have not engaged. 
The noble of a by-gone nomos often becomes the ignoble of later years. 
Loss of faith in the colonialist paradigm led to the consideration of 
alternatives,
137
 and eventually to its complete denunciation. The current 
membership in the United Nations attests to the overwhelming acceptance 
of the new paradigm, revolving around the core principles of sovereign 
equality, self-determination and non-intervention.
138
 It is not without 
significance to recall that given that these principles have not been 
inscribed on a tabula rasa, “alien occupation,” i.e., the exercise of 
effective control by a foreign military force over a territory over which it 
has no title and without the volition of the sovereign,
139
 echoes the soggy 
saga of the discarded paradigm. It is for this reason that the disciplinary 
matrix of international law groups belligerent occupation together with 
colonial domination, racist regimes
140
 and related practices of 
“subjugation, domination and exploitation.”141 A new international legal 
order has replaced the Eurocentric legal order. The LCR remains deeply 
rooted in the latter. 
The LCR’s anachronistic reading of the international legal matrix, in 
terms of both the epistemic method used and its ontological consequences, 
is the Ariadne’s thread that is woven into its construction of the invalidity 
of the 1947 Partition Plan; the indeterminacy of the 1949 armistice lines 
and Jordan’s 1988 waiver of a claim to sovereignty over the West Bank,142 
in a manner that generates the foregone conclusion that Israel has a valid 
claim to sovereignty over the area. This claim, asserts the LCR, has been 
upheld by successive Israeli governments, which refrained from realizing 
it through annexation only because of their wish to “enable peace 
negotiations.”143 
The legal validity of General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) (which 
partitioned Mandatory Palestine between the Arab and Jewish 
communities in the area and approved the establishment of two States with 
 
 
 137. See generally KUHN, supra note 5, at 77. 
 138. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 1, 3, 4, 7 & art. 55, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ 
ctc/uncharter.pdf; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, ¶ 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 1916 
U.S.T. 521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 139. BENVENISTI, supra note 103, at 4. 
 140. API, supra note 66, art. 4. 
 141. See the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 
(XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625, at 122, 124 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
 142. The LCR, supra note 9, ¶ 8. See supra text between notes 46–49. 
 143. The LCR, supra note 9, ¶ 9. See supra text between notes 49–50. 
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economic union within these borders with Jerusalem and Bethlehem as 
corpus seperatum),
144
 was subject to some debate at the time but not for 
the reasons advanced in the LCR. The debate focused on the competence 
of the General Assembly: on the one hand, it is not a legislative body, and 
it is empowered merely to make recommendations;
145
 on the other hand, 
the General Assembly succeeded the Council of the League of Nations and 
the latter was competent to make binding decisions regarding Mandate 
territories.
146
 The rejection of the Resolution by Arab States, posited in the 
LCR as a ground for its invalidity,
147
 reflected their sense that the partition 
was inequitable and that the proposed Arab State would not be 
economically viable.
148
 This stand was surely significant politically, but 
not legally. By contrast, Israel’s embrace of the Resolution, which the 
LCR is silent about, carries a normative impact: given that its 1948 
Declaration of Independence incorporates a paragraph from the 
Resolution,
149
 Israel is arguably estopped from arguing against the 
Resolution’s validity.150 
The LCR is equally silent about the 1988 Palestinian Declaration of 
Independence, which also accepted the Resolution as providing 
international legitimacy to the “right of the Palestinian Arab people to 
 
 
 144. The Partition Plan, supra note 45, at 133, 135, 139, 146. 
 145. U.N. Charter arts. 10–14. 
 146. This was the position of then Secretary-General Trygve Lie, see PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE 
SECRETARIES-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, VOL. 1: TRYGVE LIE, 1946–1953 106–15 (Andrew 
W. Cordier & Wilder Foote eds., 1969). See also, Richard J. Tyner, Wars of National Liberation in 
Africa and Palestine: Self-Determination for Peoples or for Territories, 5 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. 
ORD. 234, 265 (1978–1979); Alan Levine, The Status of Sovereignty in East Jerusalem and the West 
Bank, 5 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 485, 486 (1972). On the General Assembly as successor to the 
Assembly of the League of Nations in matters pertaining to mandate territories, see Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, supra note 61, ¶¶ 55–
72. 
 147. The other ground advanced in the LCR to invalidate G.A. Resolution 181 was the U.N. 
Charter art. 80, a point already addressed, see supra text and notes 135–36. 
 148. See, e.g., Kattan, supra note 131, at xxxiii–xxxviii. 
 149. Declaration of establishment of state of Israel from May 14, 1948, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20establishment%20of 
%20state%20of%20israel.aspx. The Declaration refers to G.A. Res. 181 as “calling for the 
establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel . . . This recognition by the United Nations of the right 
of the Jewish people to establish their State is irrevocable.” 
 150. On estoppel under international law, see generally, The Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia 
v. Thai.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 22–26 (June 15); Phil C.W. Chan, Acquiescence/Estoppel in International 
Boundaries: Temple of Preah Vihear Revisited, 3 CHINESE J. INT’L. L. 421 (2004). The ICJ revisited 
the case in 2013, following the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case 
Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgment (Nov. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/151/17704.pdf. See Simon Chesterman, The International Court of 
Justice in Asia: Interpreting the Temple of Preah Vihear Case, 5 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 1 (2015). 
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national sovereignty and independence.”151 Finally, in the words of the 
ICJ, “the responsibility of the United Nations” in matters relative to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, “has its origin in the Mandate and the Partition 
Resolution concerning Palestine . . .”152 Having been referred to in 
numerous later resolutions, including the resolution which requested the 
ICJ to render an advisory opinion on the legality of the construction of the 
wall in the OPT,
153
 it reflects the universally accepted basis for the 
establishment in the land of Mandatory Palestine of “two independent 
States, one Arab, the other Jewish.”154 
The road leading the Levy Committee to its destination regarding 
exclusive Jewish sovereignty over Mandatory Palestine passes through 
two additional signposts: the 1949 armistice lines and the 1988 Jordanian 
waiver of sovereignty over the West Bank. The armistice lines were drawn 
in various agreements, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 62 
(1948).
155
 The Rhodes agreement of April 1949 between Israel and Jordan, 
fixed the demarcation line known as the “Green Line.”156 The latter was 
never officially designated as a final boundary and indeed the agreement 
itself allows for revisions by mutual consent.
157
 It does not, however, 
follow that the Green Line is devoid of legal meaning, let alone that Israel 
has a sovereign right in the OPT. Quite the opposite: so long as such 
consent has not been reached, and given the principle of non-acquisition of 
territory by force, “the Palestinian territories east of the Green Line”, in 
the words of the ICJ, “are occupied.”158 By the same token, Jordan’s 
waiver of its claim to sovereignty over the West Bank does not generate 
the LCR’s conclusion that said waiver “has restored the original legal 
status of the territory,” that is, Jewish sovereignty.159 It does not because 
under the prevailing international legal paradigm, the original legal status 
 
 
 151. Palestine National Council, Nov. 15, 1988, available at http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ ForeignPolicy/ 
MFADocuments/Yearbook7/Pages/396%20Palestinian%20National%20Council%20political%20stateme
.aspx. 
 152. Construction of the Wall, supra note 69, ¶ 49. 
 153. G.A. Res. ES-10/14, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/14 (Dec. 12, 2003). See also Construction of 
the Wall, supra note 69, ¶ 1. 
 154. Id. ¶ 76. 
 155. S.C. Res. 62, U.N. Doc. S/1080 (Nov. 16, 1948). 
 156. Hashemite Jordan Kingdom—Israel: General Armistice Agreement, U.N. Doc. S/1302/Rev.1 
(Apr. 3, 1949), adopted by the Security Council in S.C. Res. 72, U.N. Doc. S/RES/72 (Aug. 11, 1949). 
The term “Green Line” refers to the armistice line, “owing to the color of the ink used for it on maps” 
during the armistice talks, see Construction of the Wall, supra note 69, ¶ 72. 
 157. Armistice Agreement, supra note 156, art. IX. 
 158. Construction of the Wall, supra note 69, ¶¶ 78, 101. 
 159. The LCR, supra note 9, proviso of ¶ 8, see also supra text between notes 46–49. 
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of the territory was not, and was not intended to be, under Jewish 
sovereignty.
160
 
The nomos inhabited by the members of the Levy Committee consists 
of entirely different terrains and shades of visibility. In it, there is no 
Palestinian people vested with a right to self-determination; the West Bank 
is terra nullius,
161
 an empty space; “a land without people” still awaiting to 
be restored “to a people without a land;”162 a land over which Jews have 
always had a right of possession; a land promised once by the good Lord 
and once again by another Lord representing the British Empire; indeed; a 
land impregnated with Jewish sovereignty. In the nomos inhabited by the 
rest of the international community, there is a right to self-determination. 
That right exists erga omnes.
163
 That right “was the ultimate objective of 
the mandate system.”164 That right stems from a principle enshrined in the 
UN Charter.
165
 The Palestinian people enjoy this right, and thus have a 
claim to sovereignty over the territory. Israel is under an obligation to 
respect this right.
166
 The admission of Palestine as a Member State to 
various international governmental organizations,
167
 coupled with 
Palestine’s accession to the Rome Statute,168 has not settled the debate 
 
 
 160. Israel itself accepted this normative position. See infra text between notes 170–74. 
 161. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, ¶¶ 79–80 (Oct. 16) (“[T]he State 
practice of the relevant period indicates that territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social 
and political organization were not regarded as terrae nullius . . . the acquisition of sovereignty was 
not generally considered as effected unilaterally through “occupation” of terra nullius by original title 
but through agreements concluded with local rulers”). 
 162. This phrase, attributed to British writer Israel Zangwill, was first used in the writings of 
nineteen century Evangelical writers. On its genesis see Diana Muir, A Land Without People for a 
People Without a Land, XV MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY 55 (2008). 
 163. Construction of the Wall, supra note 69, ¶ 155; Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, supra note 61, ¶ 126; East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 
1995 I.C.J. 90, ¶ 29 (June 30, 1995). 
 164. Construction of the Wall, supra note 69, ¶ 88. 
 165. U.N. Charter, art. 1, ¶ 2, art. 55. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Palestine was admitted as a member state at UNESCO in 2011. UNESCO G.C., 36th Sess., 
36 C/PLEN/DR.1 (Oct. 29, 2011), see also Larry D. Johnson, Palestine’s Admission to UNESCO: 
Consequences Within the United Nations?, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 118 (2011–2012); Palestine 
was upgraded to non-member observer state status in the U.N. in 2012. G.A. Res. 67/19, U.N. Doc 
A/RES/67/19 (Nov. 29, 2012), see also Dapo Akande, Palestine as a UN Observer State: Does this 
Make Palestine a State?, EJIL: TALK!—BLOG OF THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/palestine-as-a-un-observer-state-does-this-make-palestine-a-state. 
 168. See the ICC press releases of Jan. 7, 2015, “The State of Palestine accedes to the Rome 
Statute”, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/ 
pr1082_2.aspx, and of Jan. 16, 2015, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/ 
press%20releases/Pages/pr1083.aspx. 
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whether or not it meets the criteria of statehood,
169
 but it surely attests to 
the overwhelming view of the international community on the right of the 
Palestinians to exercise self-determination in the form of a Palestinian 
State in the OPT. 
There can be little doubt that Israel’s actual display of respect for the 
Palestinian claim to sovereignty over the OPT leaves a lot to be desired. 
From a normative perspective however, and contrary to the assertion of the 
LCR, since the early 1990s, successive Israeli governments did recognize 
this claim and they continue to do so. 
In the various agreements constituting the Oslo Accords
170
 signed by 
then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Israel recognized the PLO for the first 
time as the representative of the Palestinian people, acknowledged the 
reciprocal political rights of both parties, and specifically recognized the 
Palestinian’s people right to acquire sovereignty over much of the OPT.171 
Indeed, this recognition, as the LCR should have but failed to 
acknowledge, severed any possible nexus between the former Jordanian 
rule in the West Bank and the question of Israel’s sovereignty over the 
territory.
172
 Neither the second intifada, nor the governments formed later 
by a Likkud-led coalitions invalidated these agreements.
173
 Even Prime 
Minister Netanyahu accepted, in his 2009 Bar Ilan speech, that the final 
political solution must include a Palestinian State, “side by side with the 
Jewish State.”174 
 
 
 169. See, e.g., Francis A. Boyle, The Creation of the State of Palestine, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 301 
(1990) (arguing that Palestine is de facto a state, since all four elements that constitute one, according 
to the Montevideo convention, are already fulfilled: territory, population, government and the capacity 
to enter into relations with other states); James Crawford, The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too 
Much Too soon?, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 307 (1990) (claiming that these conditions are yet to be realized). 
See also JOHN QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE (2010) (the main thrust of the book is the 
proposition that Palestine has long met the international legal criteria for statehood, especially when 
compared to other entities accepted as States, such as Kosovo, Micronesia, The Marshall Islands and 
Palau); Weiler, supra note 17. 
 170. These include the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Sept. 
13, 1993), http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/asp/event_frame.asp?id=37; Agreement on the Gaza 
Strip and the Jericho Area (May 4, 1994), http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/asp/ event_frame.asp?id= 
38; the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Sept. 28, 1995), 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/heskemb_eng.htm; Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in 
Hebron (Jan. 15, 1997), http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/asp/event_frame.asp?id=45; and the Wye 
River Memorandum (Oct. 23, 1998), http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/The 
%20Wye%20River%20Memorandum.aspx. 
 171. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, supra note 170. 
 172. See, e.g., Jean Salmon, Declaration of the State of Palestine, 5 PAL. Y.B. INT’L L. 56, 57 
(1989). 
 173. See UNPRECEDENTED, supra note 11, part A.3.3.2. 
 174. Full text of the speech is available at http://www.haaretz.com/news/full-text-of-netanyahu-s-
foreign-policy-speech-at-bar-ilan-1.277922.  
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The odyssey undertaken by the Levy Committee requires it to explain 
why Israel, as the lawful sovereign of the West Bank, did not simply 
annex it. The explanation, according to the LCR, is Israel’s wish “to 
enable peace negotiations.”175 This policy assessment may well qualify as 
an apology for power, but it is neither a legal argument, nor is it 
convincing in view of the de jure annexation of Jerusalem,
176
 surely a 
major issue in the peace negotiations. Indeed, it serves to obfuscate rather 
than illuminate the puzzle. Could it not be that Israel did not annex the 
territories because it has, at least thus far, gained more than it lost by 
keeping its current form of control over the OPT? The ontology of this 
occupation, suggests that indeterminacy is its determinate feature, and 
offers an alternative explanation.
177
 According to this suggestion, 
Israel acts in the territory as a sovereign insofar as it settles its 
citizens there and extends to them its laws on a personal and on a 
mixed personal/territorial bases, yet insofar as the territory has not 
been formally annexed and insofar as this exercise of sovereignty 
falls short of giving the Palestinian residents citizenship rights, 
Israel is not acting as a sovereign. In this manner, Israel enjoys both 
the powers of an occupant and of a sovereign in the OPT, while 
Palestinians enjoy neither the rights of an occupied people nor the 
rights of citizenship. This indeterminacy allows Israel to avoid 
accountability in the international community for having illegally 
annexed the territories, while pursuing the policies of “greater 
Israel” in the West Bank without jeopardizing its Jewish majority.178 
The policies of ‘Greater Israel’ in the West Bank advance a hegemonic 
vision. The structural indeterminacy inherent in the application of the 
international legal paradigm of the law of belligerent occupation by Israeli 
 
 
 175. The LCR, supra note 9, ¶ 9. 
 176. Israel initially objected to the use of the term ‘annexation’ to describe its imposing of Israeli 
law and administration on East Jerusalem, claiming it was done for purely municipal and 
administrative reasons. The Basic Law: Jerusalem, The Capital of Israel, 34 LSI 209 (1980), put this 
objection to rest. From an international legal perspective the annexation of East Jerusalem (expanding 
gradually its boundaries from 6.5 to 71 square kilometers) is illegal. This illegality was affirmed by 
both the Security Council and the General Assembly and the ICJ. See S.C. Res. 478, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/478 (Aug. 20, 1980); G.A. Res. 35/169E, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/169E, (Dec. 15, 1980); S.C. 
Res. 673, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (Oct. 24, 1990); Construction of the Wall, supra note 69, ¶ 122. 
 177. Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 60, at 609–12. Note that the interplay between the 
temporary and the indefinite, supra text and notes 59–72, and between occupation / non occupation (as 
attested to by the application of the GCIV by the HCJ while never acknowledging that it is under an 
obligation to do so), supra text and notes 74–81, operates in the context of annexation / non-
annexation as well. 
 178. Id. at 610–11 (footnotes omitted). 
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governmental and judicial authorities to the territory has served as an 
apology for power, which has facilitated the piecemeal realization of this 
vision. The LCR steps out of the structural confinements of the discipline. 
It does not present an argument intra-legem. It is, quite simply, contra-
legem. It reflects an insular vision of power and destiny that that requires 
no apology.
179
 
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
“Don Quixote’s misfortune is not his imagination, 
But Sancho Panza” 
—FRANZ KAFKA, THE BLUE OCTAVO NOTEBOOKS180 
The profession of faith is not to be confused with a profession. The deep 
conviction shared by the members of the Levy Committee in the sovereign 
right of the Jewish people to the entire land of Mandatory Palestine is not 
shared, as posited above, by the community comprising the international 
legal profession. The failing of the LCR is not, however, to be attributed to 
the mere fact that its reading of the relevant international legal paradigm 
differs from the prevailing view. The position maintained by a majority is 
not necessarily closer to the truth than the position espoused by the few. It 
is not a quantitative but a qualitative blemish, consisting of both 
epistemological and ethical elements, that stains the LCR. 
In epistemic terms, inhabiting a nomos in an engaged, productive way, 
much like working creatively within a disciplinary matrix may well 
require the poetic imagination of Don Quixote but also the pragmatic 
bookkeeping of Sancho Panza. The disciplinary straightjacket is the 
mantle of the creative scientist.
181
 The members of the Levy Committee 
appeared, initially, to have willingly donned this mantle.
182
 Appearances, 
alas, are notoriously deceiving:
183
 their international legal mantle has been 
woven from the same fabric used for the making of the emperor’s new 
clothes. The Levy Committee did not merely offer an interpretation of the 
prevailing international legal paradigm different from that shared by the 
 
 
 179. Gross, supra note 17, makes a somewhat similar point when he observes that the Levy 
Committee’s conclusions are “helpful in piercing the veil of legal hypocrisy behind Israeli control in 
the territories.” 
 180. FRANZ KAFKA, THE BLUE OCTAVO NOTEBOOKS 15 (2004). 
 181. KUHN, supra note 5, at 144–45. 
 182. See supra text between notes 57–58. 
 183. In reference to the language used by Judge Krylov in his dissenting opinion in Conditions of 
Admission of a State to Membership in The United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 107 
(May 28). 
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majority of experts; it ignored them and advanced a paradigm they had 
discarded. Given that the old paradigm was not merely discarded but 
discredited, and given further that “the very existence of science depends 
upon the vesting of power to choose between paradigms in the members of 
a special kind of community,”184 it is no wonder that the LCR’s attempt to 
change the rules of the game was met with little more than professional 
derision.
185
 It does not follow that, at times, an out-of-date paradigm 
cannot be resurrected “as a special case of its up-do-date successor,” as 
Kuhn acknowledges, but “it must be transformed for the purpose.”186 No 
trace of such transformation can be detected in any of the stale arguments 
of the LCR. From a disciplinary perspective the outcome is “just a 
research failure, one which reflects not on nature but on the scientist[s].”187 
A research failure is a matter internal to the professional community. A 
professional community, however, is more than a body of knowledge 
shared by its members. It is also engaged in a relationship with the society 
that expects to benefit from the knowledge, without being able to evaluate 
its professional merits.
188
 It is for this reason that trust is the defining 
feature of this relationship. From this perspective, for an expert body, such 
as the Levy Committee, to give the impression that one’s views speak for 
the community of experts, when they do not, is not “just a research 
failure.” It is also an ethical obstruction.189 
The focus on the methodology employed in the LCR offers a critique 
of the epistemological and ethical foundations of its attempt to revise the 
prevailing international legal paradigm. Insofar as a move from paradigm 
to paradigm presents the question “where in this movement can one 
discern the ethical?,”190 this critique also extends to the substantive 
objective of the LCR. The formal objective of the Levy Committee was to 
 
 
 184. KUHN, supra note 5, at 167. 
 185. “The group’s members as individuals and by virtue of their shared training and experience,” 
says Kuhn, “must be seen as the sole possessors of the rules of the game.” Id., at 168. For the reaction 
of the professional community see supra note 17. 
 186. Id. at 103. 
 187. Id. at 35. On the ideological bent of the members of the Levy Committee, see supra text and 
notes 11–14. It should be noted that the ethical problem with the Levy Committee is traced to the 
reason for its creation (i.e., to ‘legalize’ the outposts, and extends to the choice of its members: 
“Selecting an expert who you think will likely support your position is an epistemic vice . . . selecting 
an expert because you know she will support your position is a form of deception (or of self-deception) 
and hence an ethical vice.” Kovac, supra note 8, at 407, quoting Hardwig, supra note 15, at 97). 
 188. Kovac, supra note 8, at 397–98. 
 189. Id. at 406 (relying on John Hardwig, The Role of Trust in Knowledge, 88 J. PHIL. 693 
(1991)). 
 190. Charles Carroll, Nuremberg: Judgment and Challenge—The Rediscovery of the Law Above 
the Statutory, 6 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 207 (1995–1996). 
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legalize the outposts. The text of the LCR discloses a far more ambitious 
telos: to offer a legal framework for the extension of Jewish sovereignty to 
the West Bank.
191
 
The offering of an organizing principle for a community to adopt is the 
essence of utopian thinking. Insofar as a real place is experienced by a 
community as no place (outopia) generating a wish to reach a good place 
(eutopia),
192
 there is nothing wrong with such thinking. There is also 
nothing wrong in impregnating legal texts with a meaning that reflects a 
particular vision shared by a minority. Indeed, in pluralistic communities, 
such as the international community, a majority is not ipso facto right. The 
question of right or wrong depends on the nature of the utopian vision, as 
determined by the relevant community in a discursive process. A nomic 
insularity that does not engage in this process renounces it. The members 
of the Levy Committee inhabited such an “enclosed nomian island.”193 
The relevant community relative to the real place defined as the 
Mandatory land of Palestine is the international community, as represented 
by the United Nations, as reiterated by its main judicial organ.
194
 That 
community, comprising of international legal experts and non-experts 
alike, has determined that the right to self-determination in the form of 
sovereignty over the land is granted to both the Jewish and the Palestinian 
peoples.
195
 The realization of that right only by the Jewish people is 
generally viewed as regressive, and the paradigmatic move advanced by 
the LCR as ethically dystopian. Its realization by both is progress. The 
prevailing international legal paradigm is designed to facilitate this 
progress, not to jeopardize it.
196
 Between the design and its 
implementation, however, lay the indeterminacy of the discipline and the 
 
 
 191. Justice Levy passed away on March 11, 2014. Immediately thereafter, some commentators 
called on the government to pay due tribute to his legacy by adopting the LCR. See, e.g., Gali Ginat, 
Supreme Court Justice Edmond Levy dies at 72, WALLA! (Mar. 11, 2014), http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/ 
10/2728436 (quoting Deputy Minister of Religious Services Eli Ben-Dahan: “It would be an act of 
memorial to a great judge, if the report that carries his name would be approved by the government”) 
[Hebrew]; Ofer Aderet & Revital Hovel, Former Supreme Court Justice Edmond Levi Dies, 
HA’ARETZ (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/law/1.2267213 (quoting Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Ze’ev Elkin: “The Israeli government should adopt the LCR without delay, as a final 
moral imperative Justice Levi left us”) [Hebrew]. 
 192. Thomas More’s ‘Utopia’ is a pun of the original Greek terms ‘outopia’ and ‘eutopia’. 
THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA (Paul Turner trans., Penguin Books 1965) (1516); Martin Parker, Utopia and 
the Organizational Imagination: Eutopia, in UTOPIA AND ORGANIZATION 217 (Martin Parker ed. 
2002). 
 193. Cover, supra note 21, at 36 (describing the Garrisonian abolitionist in the anti-slavery battle). 
 194. See Construction of the Wall, supra note 69, ¶ 49. 
 195. See supra text and notes 128–38, 160–69. 
 196. “Viewed from within any single community” notes Kuhn, “whether of scientists or of non-
scientists, the result of successful creative work is progress.” See KUHN, supra note 5, at 162. 
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relative weakness of its authority structure, allowing Israel to speak the 
law as it advances the very vision of the Levy Committee.
197
 The LCR 
provides it with no incentive to discontinue this practice. But the 
compelling interest of the international community in eradicating such 
practices should. That interest has been disclosed in the arduous struggle 
for self-determination and substantiated in the nomos that has transformed 
it from a political aspiration into a right erga omnes and a core principle of 
the community.
198
 The international legal project is about such 
transformations. 
 
 
 197. See supra text and notes 174–79. 
 198. See supra text and notes 160–70. 
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